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PRIVATIZING PUBLIC LANDS: MARKET SOLUTIONS TO
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS
Richard L. Stroup*
I. INTRODUCTION
Should land now in government hands be privatized-turned over to
the private sector? Those who say no argue that private sector decisions,
made by private owners, tend to seek short-term profits, to be short-sight-
ed in general, and therefore to treat land poorly, causing environmental
devastation in the process. This paper scrutinizes this view, addressing the
question of the impact of private ownership on environmental quality in
general, looking especially at the question of shortsightedness.
Are private land use decisions worse for future citizens than public
decisions? To some extent, we must address the question indirectly be-
cause it is difficult to compare management of government land and man-
agement of private land. Government land is rarely sold or traded so we
do not have good information about its value. Without markets, it is diffi-
cult to know if the government has been a good steward as measured by
changes in the value of the land, or to determine if land is worth more or
less than land that has been in private hands.
Simply looking at data on the physical condition of the land is not
sufficient, in part because the goals of government management change
with elections and the change of administrations. National forests once
valued for their timber production may now be viewed as places where
trees should be preserved until they succumb to fire, disease, or insects. Is
cut-over land that is replanted good (because it is a sign of renewable
harvest)? Or is it bad (because it is a sign of old growth destroyed or
habitat disturbed)? Similarly, should grazing land be evaluated as forage
for livestock or for elk and other wild animals? Viewpoints differ.
Still, there are some cases where public and private decisions can be
directly observed and objectively compared. When we make such compar-
isons, we find that the claim that private decisions look more to the pres-
ent and less to the future than do public decisions is not supported. In this
paper we will marshal several pieces of evidence that suggest that over the
long run a market system in which most resources are privately owned is
better for environmental protection than is a system in which government
ownership predominates. The logic driving such a conclusion is summa-
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nzed in the following three points:
1) Enforced, tradeable property rights, enforceable at common law,
protect people from excessive pollution, just as they protect individuals
and property from damage from other sources.' Private owners have the
standing, or the right (as do government owners or trustees) to sue for
injunctive relief, to stop those who would damage their property, or after
the fact to sue for damages. Also, private owners, with their personal
wealth at stake, have the incentive to be alert to possible damages and to
be aggressive in protecting the resources they own. Once precedents are
set in the defense against pollution, then in future cases where court deci-
sions are predictable, few owners will have to actually go to court in order
to protect their property rights against harmful pollution from sources
similar to those in settled cases. Contingency fees and class action suits
can help owners to reach court in novel cases and in cases in which the
facts do not convince polluters to a pretrial settlement.
2) Private rights require that users pay the costs of the resources they
use, unlike government decisions, which distribute the costs of resource
use according to the political process. Thus, private ownership limits waste
because users, who must pay, seek to reduce resource use in order to
minimize costs. Furthermore, the fact that users pay market value to use a
resource means that resource demands are limited automatically, as prod-
uct users try to reduce costs, in sharp contrast to resource demand in the
public sector, where the price of use (but not the cost to other users) is
typically zero and demands thus much less constrained. Battles over public
lands are classic examples of relatively unconstrained demands, each user
group, not having to pay for what it demands believes its mission-and
thus its demands-to be far more important and even more noble, than the
missions of other groups. Nasty political battles over the relative merits of
alternative land uses, and the merits of the users, are the normal result.
3) Markets enable the economic participants in a nation to become
more innovative and more prosperous. Because private individuals and
firms finance their own innovations (rather than relying on governmental
support), they need to convince only a few investors, not the average voter
or the Congress, that devoting resources to trying a new idea is worth the
risk. Those who provide capital for successful ventures earn profits, at
least temporarily; those who finance losing ventures experience losses.
Each reaps what he sows.
This applies even to short-term investors, because liabilities incurred
are capitalized into asset value as soon as they can be discovered by actual
and potential investors. For example, when word gets out that Acme Corp.
1. See generally, BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRON-
MENT 95-115 (1997) (explaining common law protection of property and environment).
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has unexpectedly incurred a large liability (or is even rumored to have
done so), Acme stock is likely to fall immediately, instantly punishing
those holding the stock. Similarly, word of a new product or policy that
will reduce costs without revenue reduction, or increase revenue more than
cost, will reward stockholders of the moment with a stock price increase.
The creation of net value, and the accrual of liability are both capitalized
into asset values as soon as investors can know, or even strongly suspect
them. Of course the firm may try to hide its liabilities or its liability-con-
nected actions from possible victims, both physical and financial, just as a
criminal will try to hide a crime. But investors, even more than the police,
have a personal financial incentive to be the first to know about hidden
problems. After all, their personal wealth is at stake, and the investor who
knows early can "bail out" of an ownership stake by selling quickly, be-
fore the market value falls. But such sales drive the price down and be-
come a warning and a punishment to others who were less careful or less
observant. Hiding liability problems is difficult, especially when there are
professional investment advisors who specialize by industry, and environ-
mental watchdogs ready to blow the whistle. Yet concealment happens.
The system, like crime control and regulation, is not perfect.
An additional problem here can be the judgement-proof tort-feasor or
investors hiding behind the corporate veil and operating a corporation with
little asset value. They may incur a liability for which recovery is impos-
sible. That is why, for clearly dangerous activities, this author among
others has suggested that regulators require a bond as a "hostage" to good
(liability-free) management.2 For the corporation with large capital value,
however, this is not a problem. The corporation can be held to account,
and each investor stands to suffer his or her share of any loss.
The market system provides firms with the ability and incentive to
innovate, spurring technology, which typically reduces the industrial waste
which is the greatest source of pollution in the production process. It
makes more efficient resource utilization possible. So long as property
rights are enforced, the possible liability of a new technology (and the
impact of existing or possible injuncfions) will be compared to its cost.
Because trade and innovation increase prosperity, this sort of regime en-
courages environmental protection. A richer citizenry has the willingness
and the ability to achieve the environmental protection that as poorer
people they could not. The results have been impressive differences
among nations according to the degree to which each emphasizes market
allocation of resources rather than governmental (political) decisions. The
2. Richard L. Stroup, Hazardous Waste Policy: A Property Rights Perspective, 20 ENV'T REP.
868-73 (Bureau of National Affairs Sept. 22, 1990).
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market nations of western Europe, for example, used far less energy and
steel, per unit of output, than did the socialized nations of eastern Eu-
rope.3 A richer people can also use added materials, increasing through-
put. But prosperity is important to the ability and willingness of citizens to
make sacrifices in order to achieve a safer, cleaner and more pleasing
environment. In the boom decades for market economies that followed
World War II, the net result was cleaner air, despite greater industrial pro-
duction. Indeed, in the United States, the air was becoming cleaner more
rapidly in regard to particulate and sulfur dioxide in the 1960s, before the
1970 Clean Air Act, than it did following the act, in the 1970s.4
Before going further on these points, it will be useful to clarify what
is meant, here, by private ownership. Primarily, it means 1) the recogni-
tion and protection of property rights to resources, including land; and 2)
the ability of owners of rights to trade them through contracts to sell,
lease, and make rental arrangements. Private ownership of a resource
means that the owner can decide where a resource will be best employed
among alternative uses in time and space, and can take action to achieve
that goal. Owners reap the benefits of good decisions personally, but per-
sonally suffer the costs of failure to protect the value of the resource, or
allowing it to be wasted, or using it in a way that does harm and creates
liability That is how, in a system of private ownership, owners are per-
sonally and financially accountable for their decisions. This includes own-
ers (shareholders) of corporations, as a corporation's stock price fluctuates
with increase liability or increased profit potential.5 But in most cases the
individual's decisions are limited to which corporate shares to buy and
which to sell. Managers and boards of directors are, in effect, hired by
shareholders to make specific investment and other business decisions for
the shareholders.'
II. THE LINK BETWEEN FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY
There is no longer any doubt that the economies that are oriented
toward free markets-those with less government involvement in decision-
making and a greater emphasis on private property-have performed better
economically
Figure 1, from the recent work of Gwartney and Lawson, illustrates
the strong relationship between private control of the economy and the
3. MIKHAIL BERNSTAM, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 24 (1991).
4. See ROBERT W CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND
POLITICS OF CLEAN AIR 19 (1983).
5. Michael Jensen & William Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior Agen-
cy Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. OF FIN. & ECON. (1976).
6. JAMES GWARTNEY & RICHARD STROUP, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE (8th ed. 1997).
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achievement of prosperity and economic growth.7 Those economies with
greater degrees of economic freedom (greater private control) are assigned
higher scores by Gwartney and Lawson on the basis of composite, objec-
tive published data. Higher scores reflect a greater role for private owners,
and a greater freedom on their part to trade with others. The figures show
that economies with a greater role for private ownership and decisions
tend strongly to exhibit both greater prosperity and more rapid economic
growth. As a result of this relationship, policies in many nations around
the world are moving away from government ownership and management
of resources.
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In other words, the payoff to citizens, in the form of a higher stan-
dard of living, and one that rises over time, is greater when a larger pro-
portion of decisions is made privately, by individuals who are more per-
sonally accountable for the costs as well as the benefits resulting from
those decisions.
Private decision making does not imply the absence of government.
Trading begins only after rights are delineated, often in common law
7. JAMES GWARTNEY AND ROBERT LAWSON, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD 34 (1997).
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courts ruled largely by precedent (the results of previous decisions).'
Owners with established rights can make offers to buy, sell or trade. It is
the offers to buy and sell that provide the constant flow of information
and incentives that tends automatically to weed out inefficient trade-
offs-less for buyer and/or seller-of all sorts. When producers are paying
the full costs of what they sell because they are liable for pollution and
other costs, and when buyers must pay the full value of what they get and
use, because they cannot pass costs on to others, then the waste of re-
sources is costly and thus undesired. It is when government is unable or
unwilling to protect individual property rights against cost imposed by
others that private decisions fail to properly discipline producer/sellers and
user/buyers.9
Private decision making thus has favorable impacts on environmental
quality, to the extent that resource users pay full costs for materials, and
polluters are held accountable for damages they cause (or are restrained by
injunction from damaging others). For example, waste is reduced because
no one is forced to subsidize inefficient investments or other expenditures.
8. See Roger Meiners, Elements of Property Rights: The Common Law Alternative, in LAND
RIGHTS: THE 1990'S PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 269-93 (Bruce Yandle ed., 1995) (describing the
history of the common law and its role in protecting property and the environment).
9. See STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 403-11 (1988) (explaining
incomplete property rights, in which users may not pay the cost of what they use).
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Subsidies, however, or other forms of failure to recognize and enforce the
rights of those harmed will reduce the benefits of private decision mak-
ing.'0
Another result of market decision making is that relatively little acri-
mony is produced. We can assume that offers to buy, sell or trade are
carefully considered and seldom falsified because the traders pay the pric-
es and receive the revenues themselves. There is little incentive in a mar-
ket to posture, or to adopt sanctimonious attitudes and condemn other user
demands as frivolous, as so often happens in discussions over the use of
federal land. An illustration of the contrast between the constructive nature
of private negotiations and the contentious nature of political discussions
between parties of vastly different priorities is the example of the National
Audubon Society While officials of the Audubon Society are outspoken
and hostile in their arguments against oil drilling on a federal wildlife
refuge in Alaska, they have worked comfortably and peaceably with the
private oil company that they have allowed to produce natural gas on the
Rainey Preserve, which the National Audubon Society owns in Louisi-
ana." Gas is produced only after Audubon's strict stipulations are met by
producers; Audubon uses the resulting revenue to enhance its mission on
the refuge and elsewhere. Audubon has the right to determine what hap-
pens on its land, and it has strong incentives to avoid risking the loss of
support from its members by allowing damage to the habitat it owns; but
it also has the right to gain support for its mission by producing petro-
leum-Audubon's mission can be given a net gain by natural gas revenues
that contribute more than the tiny losses to existing habitat resulting from
the careful petroleum extraction procedures. 2
While the ability of markets to produce efficient utilization of re-
sources and prosperity for market participants is seldom questioned today,
the effect of markets on environmental quality is another matter. Everyone
recognizes that markets often fail to produce ideal results. That is especial-
ly true when courts are unable to protect the rights of resource owners. If
pollution is harming one or more landowners, for example, but the owners
cannot show by weight of the evidence that they are being harmed, courts
cannot stop the polluter, nor make him pay If the harm is real and signifi-
cant in such a case, then a negative effect of production is not represented
in the market. The producer is not paying the full cost of production, and
10. Id. at 232-36.
11. See Pamela Snyder & Jane S. Shaw, PC Oil Drilling in a Wildlife Refuge, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 7, 1995, at A14 (giving a brief history and overview of the Audubon's decisions on its Paul J.
Rainey Sanctuary).
12. See also John Baden & Richard Stroup, Saving the Wilderness: A Radical Proposal, REA-
SON, July 1981, at 28-36 (describes and explains this type of decision-making process).
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need not take fully into account the environmental harm. Failure by the
courts to protect property rights can prevent the proper flow of incentives
to market participants, in the same way that failure to enforce laws and
regulations of any sort can defeat the intent of the law
Further, there are entire classes of pollution problems, from air pollu-
tion in the Los Angeles basin to carbon dioxide emissions and their poten-
tial effects on global climate, that cannot be handled directly by the prop-
erty rights/common law/market approach. There are simply too many
polluters and too many victims of pollution (perhaps the same individu-
als). Many individuals suffer, but each may suffer only a little.'" Who
will undertake a lawsuit? Settlement of such problems is more logically
political (statutory and regulatory) rather than by enforcement of individ-
ual rights.
Markets clearly are imperfect. But the important question is: Com-
pared to what? Government ownership or regulatory control are often
suggested, and offer the hope of improvement. But will these options in
fact produce superior results? More precisely, the important question is
this: where and when will private rights and markets perform better than
the available alternatives, the major one being direct government con-
trol?'4 Suppose there is a case of runoff water pollution, allegedly coming
from a forest and causing harm downstream. The traditional private sector
remedy is for the harmed party to sue for relief. But the absence of good
information on whether the runoff from the forest in this case is harmful,
for example, can make it difficult to enforce the rights of those down-
stream to be free of harm; and enforcement is necessary for a working
market. But in that situation, can anyone, in government or not, make
better decisions than the courts?" When research on such matters is re-
viewed and published, and when experts can be brought to court or to an
agency, then both systems have access to the same expertise. It is certainly
true that judges and juries are not experts; but in court they must listen to
experts on both sides before rendering a decision. That is not true of those
same individuals when they vote in an election, or when they vote as
elected representatives. They are unlikely to be as informed as if they had
in fact been present through a trial of the facts, with its burden of proof,
rules of evidence, and rights of cross-examination. Absent the problem of
large numbers of polluters and victims, there is no obvious reason to be-
13. For a discussion of this problem, see TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE
MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 139 (1991).
14. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES (1994) (Chapters One and
Two fully explain the nature of this institutional choice question).
15. Id. (Chapters Three, Four, and Five compare the strengths and weaknesses of courts, the
market and political regulation).
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lieve that courts must be less informed as they decide an issue than voters,
or even congressional representatives, will be on that same issue.
Will control of pollution be weaker under common law than under
direct control of government? There is in fact a good deal of evidence in
Canada where, as in the United States, statutory law and government
control has been replacing decisions by private owners, that as the political
or statutory approach supplanted the common law approach to pollution,
protection of victims was weakened. As researcher and writer Elizabeth
Brubaker says, after citing dozens of legal decisions and statutes, in 160
heavily footnoted pages of evidence: "Governments have shown that they
are not up to the task of preventing resource degradation or pollution;
indeed they have often actively encouraged it. It is long past time for
resources to be shifted away from governments and back to the individuals
and communities that have strong interests in their preservation. Such a
shift can best be accomplished by strengthening property rights and by
assigning property rights to resources now being squandered by govern-
ments."' 6 The bottom line is this: Individuals with property rights against
those who might harm them-governments included among those who
may do harm-will gain by finding ways to use those rights effectively to
protect themselves and their resources.
III. EFFICIENCY: A KEY TO ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
While markets based on private property rights are strongly associat-
ed with efficient allocation of resources and thus increased prosperity,
economic efficiency may seem inconsequential for some who care very
strongly about a clean, healthy and pleasant environment. The evidence,
however, is that economies based largely on private property and private
decisions not only* promote economic efficiency and the prosperity that
results: They generally serve environmental goals as well." There are
four major reasons:
The first is the impact of wealth itself: "Wealthier is healthier."
Among human beings, those who are wealthier generally enjoy greater
health. Aaron Wildavsky explored the many reasons that people who are
more prosperous, and those who simply live in a prosperous society, live
healthier lives in general, and live longer." A more prosperous communi-
ty, with its greater levels of education, better sewage facilities, cleaner
16. See ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN DEFENSE OF NATURE 161 (1995).
17. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1992 (1992) (Chapters Two and Three provide a de-
tailed look at the connection between property rights, economic development and environmental quali-
ty).
18. AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY CH. 3 (1988)
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water and superior infrastructure in general, better emergency response
programs, and other characteristics sought and paid for by a wealthier
citizenry, can provide a cleaner, healthier and more pleasant environment
in which to live. Many factors explain this strong connection, but protec-
tion of the natural environment against unhealthy contamination is a sig-
nificant part of that total environment.
Second, economic efficiency fosters technical efficiency, which re-
duces waste and cuts pollution. How9 There are many ways that we can
observe this happening in the world around us. For example, Mikhail
Bernstam has compiled data comparing environmental results in the largest
industrialized market economies, which are market-based, with its use in
the Eastern European socialist countries."9 Efficiency in market nations
led to reduced pollution. 0 As noted above, market-based economies in
western Europe, as elsewhere, used far less energy per $1,000 worth of
output than the socialist nations of eastern Europe in 1986." Similarly,
the European socialist economies used far more steel per unit of output
than the European market economies did.22 The government data used by
Bernstam show that across a variety of command-and-control economies,
resource use is far greater per unit of output than across a variety of mar-
ket-onented economies. More efficient use of resources generally means
less waste in production, and thus less pollution.23 The bottom line is
this: Control of resources by bureaucracies does not bring the same pres-
sures and personal incentives to conserve resources that mark private
ownership and market decisions. So bureaucratic decisions tends to be less
efficient and more wasteful, and thus less environmentally friendly
Third, the demand for environmental quality is a function of income.
Economist Donald Coursey finds that in the United States and in other
industrial nations, citizens' support for measures to improve environmen-
tal quality is highly sensitive to income changes.24 He estimates that in
industrial nations, a change in income causes a change in the demand for
environmental quality that is 2.5 times as large as the income change.
Thus, a 10 percent increase (decline) in income leads to a 25 percent
increase (decline) in citizens' willingness to pay for environmental mea-
sures. Coursey notes that everyone wants a cleaner environment; richer
people are more willing and able to divert resources from producing food,
shelter, clothing, schooling and so on, to protecting environmental quality
19. See BERNSTRAM, supra note 3, at 1-50.
20. Id. at 15-22.
21. Id. at 23.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 41-44.
24. Donald Coursey, The Demand for Environmental Quality, Amencan Economic Association
(Anaheim, CA; 1993).
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Coursey's data show that citizens' demand for environmental quality
reacts to a change in income in the same way and to the same extent as
does their demand for luxury automobiles like the BMW and Mercedes-
Benz, suggesting that we should think of environmental quality as a
BMW Make people richer and the market for the environment (e.g. dona-
tions to environmental organizations, willingness to accept effective envi-
ronmental regulations, and the demand for environmentally attractive
homes and vacations) will boom. It is no accident that the Sierra Club
draws its members disproportionately from Americans with high incomes,
as shown below ' But policies that induce inefficiency or in other ways
reduce economic growth will diminish the willingness and ability of peo-
ple to devote more resources to environmental goals will fall.26
25. Mediamark Research, Inc., Sierra Reader Survey: 1992 (1992) (Distributed by the Sierra
Club, describing the demographics of the readership of its membership magazine).
26. Three lessons emerge here--two political, the third moral. First, supply side and "opportuni-
ty" conservatives must recognize that if and as they help the population become more prosperous, a
strong and genuine increase in the demand for environmental quality follows, and they will lose politi-
cal favor without a positive environmental program. The second is that environmentalists and their
supporters must recognize that larger donations and other support for environmentalism are strongly
contingent on greater income for their constituents; environmental policies that undercut efficiency and
prosperity will undercut support for environmental goals more than proportionately. The third, more
moral lesson is that to divert resources to Sierra Club members' goals at the expense of all people,
including the poor (via higher costs for goods taxes) may serve those members well, but will not find
so much favor from those who do not choose to join (or cannot afford the relatively low membership
fee of) the Sierra Club. For them, the cost of higher environmental quality is too great until they, too,
become more prosperous.
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A fourth reason that environmentalists should want to make environ-
mental policy efficient is this: People will choose more of a good or ser-
vice, including a more effective environmental policy, when it delivers
results at a lower cost. Inefficient policies will not sell as well to voters,
donors, and other supporters (rich or poor),27 ceterts paribus. Efficient
policies to maintain and increase environmental quality will be an easier
"sell" for those of us seeking greater environmental quality A rights-based
policy, in which inefficient elements can be eliminated by voluntary trad-
ing between polluters and potential pollution victims, for example, can
greatly reduce the cost of reaching any particular environmental goal.
Under command-and-control policies, such mutually beneficial trading
between polluter and receptor is almost never allowed.
One reason why the Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund
program, designed to protect citizens and their natural resources from
pollution emanating from hazardous waste dump sites, has been so round-
ly criticized and condemned is its utter lack of economic (and environ-
mental) efficiency 28 Voters, and even the members of congress who criti-
cize the program bitterly, have not been able to change the program very
much because each of many powerful factions is, as normally happens in
the political process, holding out for the best deal for itself. This is an
27. See generally, Coursey, supra note 24.
28. JAMES V. DELONG, PRIVATIZING SUPERFUND, (Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 247,
1995) (discussing the nature and extent of Superfund's inefficiencies).
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inherent weakness in the regulatory system, similar to that which often
stymies wilderness bills and other federal land use legislation in congress.
Such a problem occurs in the private sector too. But there, by contrast,
holdouts more often find that other buyers, or other sellers have satisfied
their would-be trading partners.
How inefficient is Superfund? One measure among many is that in
1992, the EPA reported that its overhead costs in 1988 were on average
more than $328 for every hour of work performed by an individual, nor-
mally a contractor's employee, in cleaning up a site. (That is $430 in 1996
dollars, or $860,000 in EPA overhead cost for each person-year spent
actually cleaning a site.) This does not include the wage and other direct
costs, or the overhead cost charged by the contractor.29 The program is
not only costly: much of the expenditures have little value in reducing the
primary target of most cleanups to date--cancer risk.30 For example, two
Superfund researchers, commenting on their work (funded by EPA) say:
"More than 95 percent of EPA's expenditures on Superfund will entail a
cost per case of cancer in excess of $100 million per case. This is clearly
unreasonable. ' 31 In addition, billions of dollars are spent each year, near-
ly a third of which is litigation costs.
32
In summary, then, those who seek a cleaner and healthier environ-
ment have several reasons to favor efficiency (that is, market allocation):
To gain the health benefits that wealth brings; to reduce resource waste
and pollution production; to increase the prosperity that fosters higher
environmental goals; and to reduce resistance to environmental goals by
achieving them at lower cost.
All of this is not to suggest that there is no place for regulation.
Market allocation is only as effective as the definition and enforcement of
property rights over resources. There are cases such as those cited earli-
er-smog in the Los Angeles basin was one-which cannot be dealt with
effectively without government control beyond the protection of property
rights. Clearly, market allocation is not a panacea. The argument here,
instead, is that market allocation is often under-rated, especially where the
ownership and management of land is concerned.
29. See 57 Fed. Reg. 34755 (1992). The indirect cost figure of $340 was denved by taking the
$328.80, the simple average of costs across the ten regions, and updating to 1996 dollars using the
CPI-U, all items.
30. W. Kip Viscusi & James T..Hamilton, Cleaning Up Superfund, 124 PUB. INTEREST 52, 56
(1996).
31. Id. at 59.
32. LLOYD S. DIXON Er AL, PRIVATE SEcTOR CLEANUP EXPENDITURES AND TRANSACTION
COSTS AT 18 SUPERFUND SrrES 45 (Rand Institute of Civil Jusuce, 1993).
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IV How PROPERTY RIGHTS CONTRIBUTE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY33
The efficiency that comes from a market system has environmental
benefits, as we have seen. However, private property rights have more
direct environmental benefits as well.
To begin with, a resource owner has a strong incentive to exercise
good stewardship. Private ownership of property provides an incentive for
good care of the owned resource. If the resource is well cared for, it will
be more valuable and add more to the wealth of its private owner. If the
owner allows the resource to deteriorate, he or she personally bears the
cost of that negligence in the form of a decline in the value of the re-
source. The value of the property right to the resource is, in a very real
sense, a hostage to the owner's provision of good care for that resource.
The same personal financial stake is not present for a government manag-
er.
Second, in a private property/market system, a resource owner has
legal rights against anyone (usually including a government agency) who
invades-by physical presence or by pollution-and harms the resource.
Much environmental damage is prevented this way The private owner of
a forest or a farm will not sit idly by if someone is cutting down trees
without permission, or invading the property with hazardous pollutants.
Lawsuits can be used to protect those rights. For example, owners of
copper and lead smelters in the United States have been forced to compen-
sate owners of land and homes for damage from sulfur dioxide emis-
sions.34 Once such a company has been successfully sued, the decision
sets a legal precedent that discourages such action by that and other poten-
tial polluters similarly situated. If (and only to the extent that) property
rights are protected under common law, the environment will be protected
against unwanted and harmful pollution. Note, however, that a protected
right to be free of harmful pollution can and sometimes will be sold to a
polluter. Just as some individuals buy cheap small cars that are far less
safe than larger, more costly ones, and not every safety regulation is tight-
ened to the greatest possible degree, some individuals will allow their land
to be polluted. Municipal dumps, for example, can often purchase private
land which is then "polluted" when it was fully protected from pollution
prior to the sale of the property right. Still, the protection of rights can and
has very often held pollution down.
In contrast, when resources are not privately owned, no individual
will receive large personal rewards for bringing suit against polluters, even
33. See GWARTNEY, supra note 6.
34. YANDLE, supra note 1, at 96-107.
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when the source of the pollution is clear, and even when statutes provide
for the coverage of attorneys' fees. In the United States, when fish in a
river are damaged by pollution, the government is responsible for protect-
ing them, because they have no private owner with a strong personal
incentive to protect them.35 In England, however, fishing rights on a
stream (but not the fish or the water) are privately owned, and the owners
jealously guard the quality of the water because pollution can reduce the
value of those fishing rights.36 Some landmark lawsuits there, long before
the first Earth Day, set precedents in common law against polluters that to
this day dissuade potential new polluters from harming the fish or the
streams.37
V ARE MARKETS SHORTSIGHTED9
31
In spite of these facts, distrust of private ownership, especially in the
context of environmental resources, remains widespread. The assumption
that private owners would be too impatient, and thus unwilling to make
the necessary investments needed to provide the future with sufficient
forest resources, was the chief reason for the formation of the U.S. Forest
Service at the turn of the century, as indicated in the statements of note-
worthy individuals over the decades such as Bernard Fernow, first Chief
of the Forest Service (then called the Division of Forestry) who said, "the
time element, together with the large capital required in timber-wood
production, renders the forestry business undesirable to private enterprise
of circumscribed means."'39 Forests, he said, should be owned by govern-
ment because "the maintenance of continued [timber] supplies is pos-
sible only under the supervision of permanent institutions with whom
present profit is not the only motive. It calls pre-eminently for the exercise
of the providential functions of the state to counteract the destructive
tendencies of private exploitation."'
Fernow was far from alone. Harold Hotelling, a prominent natural
resource economist, warned in the 1930s that the world's finite supply of
natural resources was being rapidly, and perhaps irrevocably, depleted for
35. See, e.g., Scott H. Gordon, Economics and the Conservation Question, I J.L. & ECON. 1 10
(1958).
36. Jane S. Shaw & Richard L. Stroup, Gone Fishin', REASON, Aug.-Sept. 1988, at 34-37 (de-
scribing the English-Scottish system of common law protection of fishing rights against polluters).
37. YANDLE, supra note 1, at 107-08.
38. See also Richard L. Stroup & Sandra L. Goodman, Property Rights, Environmental Re-
sources, and the Future, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 427 (1992).
39. Barney Dowdle & Steve H. Hanke, Public Timber Policy & the Wood-products Industry, in
FORnsTLANDS PUBLIC & PRIVATE 77, 89 (Robert T. Deacon & M. Bruce Johnson eds., 1985) (quoting
BERNHARD E. FARROW, ECONOMICS & FORESTRY (1902)).
40. Id.
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personal gain.4 Hotelling recommended governmental regulation of natu-
ral resource exploitation for the good of future generations.42 More re-
cently a resource economist with the Washington-based think tank Re-
sources for the Future, Sterling Brubaker, repeated the familiar claim that
"securing the interests of future generations can only be protected by
public intervention."43
Despite its widespread acceptance, the claim that the public sector is
more far-sighted in its investment strategies than the private sector has not
been confirmed.
A fundamental characteristic of private property is that changes in the
value of a privately owned resource bring all of the anticipated future
benefits and costs of today's resource decisions immediately to bear on the
resource owner. Property rights provide long-term incentives for maximiz-
ing the value of a resource, even for owners whose personal outlook is
short term."
If using a tract of land for the construction of a toxic waste dump
reduces its future productivity, that construction lowers its value today,
and the decline in the land's value is a direct reduction in the owner's
wealth. That happens because land's current worth reflects the net present
value of its future services-the revenue from production or services re-
ceived directly from the land, minus the costs (including amounts that
must be paid to anyone harmed by escaping wastes) required to generate
the revenues.45 This assumes, of course, that investors are not fooled by a
lack of knowledge. Investment advisors and environmental watchdogs help
them in seeking to be the first to learn, so they can be the first to "bail
out" of ownership shares in a troubled firm-or buy into a firm that has
found better ways to deal with liabilities. Can problems be hidden? Yes,
just as they can be hidden from regulators. The difference is that investors
have far more personal wealth at stake, and thus a stronger incentive to
learn problems and prospects early, before other investors in order to
avoid losses or to earn profits. The future revenues minus future liabilities,
discounted to present value terms, constitute the asset value of the re-
source; estimating true values of these net profits is the stock in trade of
wise investors.' Both investors and firms make mistakes. From time to
time, there are enormous corporate losses borne by them.47 Having had
41. Harold Hotelling, The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137 (1931).
42. Id.
43. Sterling Brubaker, Land Use Concepts, in GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS, SOCIAL NEEDS
AND THE MANAGEMENT OF U.S. FORESTS 95, 103 (Roger A. Sedjo ed., 1983).
44. See also Richard L. Stroup, Discount Rate, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF iHE ENVIRONMENT 140-42
(1994).
45. Id. at 140.
46. Id.
47. For some significant examples of such errors with respect to consumer goods, see Flops,
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this experience however, these shareholders operate in the future with 1)
greater knowledge won at a high price and 2) investment capabilities that
are diminished by the amount of their losses. Successful investors learn
from experience also, and they operate with portfolios that have been
enlarged by their past profits.
Thus, fewer services from a privately owned resource, or greater
costs associated with it in the future, mean lower value (and less wealth
for the owner) now48 The day an appraiser or potential buyer can see
future problems is the day that the market value of the property, and thus
the wealth of the owner, declines by the amount of the reduction in poten-
tial buyers' willingness to pay for the resource. Not only does using land
to store hazardous waste reduce future options for the land's productivity,
but the value also may be reduced by the risk of future lawsuits if the
wastes leak and cause damage to other people or property
This is true even if the owner of the resource is a corporation, and
the corporate officers, rather than the owner-stockholders, are in control.
Corporate officers may be concerned mainly about the short term, not ex-
pecting to be present when future problems arise, but property rights hold
such decision-makers accountable.49 If a current action causes the expec-
tation of future problems, or if current expenditures are seen to promise
future benefits, those who buy and sell stock will push the stock price up
or down accordingly, capturing the reduction or the increase in future net
benefits.
Is the government likely to be a wise steward? Perhaps. But no incen-
tive exists, analogous to the prospect of capital gains to reward social
value created or preserved, and losses to punish the destruction of social
value, when the resource is publicly owned." For the individual voter,
politician or bureaucrat making decisions in the political sector to con-
stantly seek greater social benefit is a selfless act indeed.5 In the United
States, the majority of citizens of voting age have consistently been found
to be unable to name their congressional representatives. 2 Citizen-voters
Bus. WK., Aug. 16, 1993, at 76-82.
48. Stroup, Discount Rate, supra note 44, at 140.
49. The corporation may seek to escape responsibility for pollution, by looking for jurisdic-
tions-foreign nations included-where it will not be held accountable. But it is hard to see why any
democratic jurisdiction, unless it is desperately poor, would allow firms to operate when they can
escape liability to local citizens. In the U.S., there is no indication that competition among the states
for industry has led them to lower water quality regulations. See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill,
Environmental Federalism: Thinking Smaller, PERC POL'Y SERIES, Dec. 1996, at 12.
50. See also Richard L. Stroup, Controlling Earth's Resources: Markets or Socialism?, 12
POPULATION AND ENV'T: A J. OF INTERDISC. STUD. 265 (1991).
51. Id. at 269-71.
52. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Confidence and Concern: Citi-
zens View American Government, at 215-16 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1974) (this Louis Hams poll
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as a group will bear the burden of mismanagement and capture the bene-
fits of better management, but there is a key difference from operations in
the private sector: the citizen-voter is unable to sell his or her stake in the
resource in order to avoid an anticipated future cost; and unable to buy a
larger stake when future benefits are anticipated, and thus cannot benefit
personally from an early recognition of the problem or the prospect.53
Costs and benefits are created and destroyed by the decisions of voters,
politicians and civil servants, but these will be shared among all citizens.
Being better informed confers no particular advantage to the individual,
and being less informed imposes no special cost on the individual. Nor
can the individual voter avoid these costs and benefits by voting different-
ly For this reason, neither the scrutiny of investors in the private sector,
nor the rewards and punishments brought to managers by the resulting
changes in asset prices, is present to inform or to discipline decision mak-
ers when the resource is publicly owned. 4 The resulting difference in
performance between private and public ownership can be seen in the
empirical comparisons below
To test the hypothesis that private stewardship, when it can be ar-
ranged, will consider the future as effectively as, or better than, decisions
made under public ownership, is desirable. But for good evidence of this
sort, visible across individuals' experience, we need an assessment of
individual operations. Land is seldom sold by government in a straightfor-
ward manner. Trades exist, but estimating values to make comparisons is
difficult. How can we learn whether government has preserved or de-
stroyed value on its lands before it disposes of them? Without a large ar-
ray of market prices, such estimates are tricky So we turn to other market
evidence. This section describes research that compares and contrasts the
time horizons reflected in decisions in two areas in which both public and
private decisions are made. The major emphasis is on assets used to pro-
vide public services, while research in employee compensation and pen-
sion funding is described more briefly
The logic of wealth maximization in the private sector suggests that
maintenance will systematically be deferred more in the public sector than
in the private sector. For a privately owned business, preventive mainte-
nance, which extends asset life and maintains asset values, is a part of
long-term investment strategy, since failure to perform such maintenance
reduces the current value of the assets, and thus the value of the business.
Government budgets, in contrast, place capital purchases, maintenance
expenditures and current operating expenses in the same category, with no
determined that 54 percent of citizens could not name their congressional representative).
53. See Stroup, Controlling Earth s Resources, supra note 50, at 270.
54. Id. at 275.
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attempt to distinguish among them.55 The value of capital assets in use is
not evaluated in any capital market, so there is little incentive to maintain
maintenance when the same funding could be used to support spending on
current services that yield visible and immediate results.56 Yet doing so
runs down the public capital stock, yielding real but deferred costs that
must be paid later if the level of services is not to fall. This situation
provides public officials with a strong incentive to defer routine mainte-
nance until major restoration or new capital purchases are required. The
latter can be financed with borrowed funds, again deferring costs into the
future. Future voters have no say today
Few empirical studies have compjared maintenance practices and their
effects on service-life duration between publicly and privately owned
assets. But one such study of the local mass transit industry is available;
its results are consistent with the claim that private companies attempt to
preserve the value of their capital assets to a greater extent than govern-
ment organizations.
Federal Reserve economist Brian Cromwell observed the maintenance
practices of owners of mass transit vehicles around the United States. He
found that private companies expend greater resources on maintenance,
and that privately owned transit buses have longer in-service lives and do
not deteriorate as rapidly as public buses.5 7 Such a comparison may seem
to have little to do with land use and land management. But the same
questions dominate both situations: is the sacrifice today made up for by
the benefits provided tomorrow 9
Will private owners pay now for benefits to be derived later9 Private-
ly owned transit companies were shown in the study to devote more labor
hours to fleet maintenance than public agencies do (14 to 17 percent more,
after controlling for wages, operating conditions,, fleet composition and
age).5 Added maintenance is costly and reduces short-term profits, but if
properly chosen will increase asset value and prolong asset life. The added
maintenance performed by private companies allows them to keep their
buses in service longer. Over 38 percent of the buses in private fleets are
more than 12 years old, as compared to 22 percent of public fleets.59 The
55. HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 419 (2d ed. 1988).
56. See Stroup & Goodman, supra note 38, at 433-34.
57. Brian Cromwell, Capital Subsidies and the Infrastructure Crisis: Evidence from the Local
Mass-Transit Industry, 25 FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEV. ECON. REV. 11, 16 (1989).
58. Id.
59. Cromwell's study focuses on the effects of federal capital grants administered by the Urban
Mass Transit Administration (UMTA) on maintenance and scrappage rates of public sector fleet vehi-
cles. The UMTA requires local transit agencies to operate buses purchased with federal funds for at
least 12 years or 500,000 miles. Failure to do so results in ineligibility for federal assistance with new
capital purchases. Cromwell shows that this 12-year limit is below the potential operating life of 15 to
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better-maintained buses also are worth far more when they are sold. A
similar logic and similar financial pressures face the owner of any asset,
such as land, and any business, such as a forest, farm or ranch.
The figure below6" shows part of Cromwell's result: public equip-
ment depreciates more rapidly than private equipment. Cromwell used
price information collected on 645 mass transit vehicles sold by private
and public bus companies in 1987 and 1988.
Private Busses Keep Capital Value
(Maintenance is Better)
$20,000- R Privately Owned Vehicles $18,000








$0 , - --7
1961-1970 1971-1975 1976-1980
Date of Manufacture
The dramatic differences in resale prices of busses between the public
and private sector, after correcting for local factors such as the quality of
the streets and other differences in bus routes, supports the contention that
maintenance increases an asset's value. It also indicates that for the case
studied, the maintenance of privately owned assets was superior to that of
publicly owned assets, and provides some support for the claim that pn-
vate asset owners, mindful of the effects of deferred maintenance on their
current wealth through the capital market, more fully consider the effects
of future asset values in their investment strategies than do public officials,
who are always under pressure to serve current voters rather than future
voters. Without a capital market to allow today's voter to gain personally
by acting as if future costs and benefits matter, current voters appreciate
current services more than future benefits.
20 years for standard bus models when properly maintained. Id. at 15-16.
60. Id. at 15.
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The case of deferred maintenance m publicly owned bus systems is
not an isolated case. In its investment strategies affecting public assets, the
public sector has demonstrated a strong tendency to focus on immediate
pressures rather than society's long-term needs.6 When setting spending
priorities, public officials face hard choices between providing services
that yield visible and immediate benefits, and those that yield less obvious
future benefits. The structural and political incentives they face create an
apparent preference to maximize current services and defer costs into the
future.
The analytical equivalent of deferred maintenance on assets is de-
ferred compensation for employees in the public sector compared to those
in the private sector. Employers in the private sector can offer more de-
ferred compensation relative to wages and other forms of current pay, but
the cost does not change. Deferred compensation results in either pay-
ments now into, for example pension funds, or the buildup of liabilities
for future payments. Both current pay and the buildup of liabilities lower
the market value of the firm (and thus the wealth of the owners) immedi-
ately
The public sector, in contrast, has no "balance sheet" or market-deter-
mmed asset value which will decline when future liabilities are incurred.
So when more of the total compensation can be deferred in the public
sector, costs can be delayed into the future. Today's budget can be con-
centrated on providing more services for current constituents, at the ex-
pense of future taxpayers. George Peterson indicates the extent of the
government's pattern of postponing payment for current services when he
compares deferred maintenance of public works to unfunded pension lia-
bilities: "These are all ways," he says, "that the current generation of
taxpayers can consume public services, yet shift some of the costs of
paying for them to future taxpayers."'62 In summary, it is the institution of
public ownership and political control, not short-sighted public decision
makers, who determine this outcome. The analysis here in no way con-
demns the individuals (politicians and executive branch public servants)
who make public policy Public ownership itself explains the problem; it
precludes the operation of a capital market for control of the owned re-
sources, and thus fails to produce the monitoring of resource use, informa-
tion on the possible new uses that potential buyers or renters might dis-
cover and try Missing also are the incentives to heed the constant flow of
information that comes into a private market.
61. See Stroup & Goodman, supra note 38, at 433-39.
62. Urban Institute, America's Urban Capital Stock: An Interview with George E. Peterson,
URBAN INST. POL'Y & RES. REP., Spnng 1980, at 7-8.
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V CONCLUSION
The lessons outlined above apply to land just as they apply to other
resources. Private ownership, with enforcement of rights via common law
and with cooperation arranged via markets, protects environmental quality
for a number of reasons:
1. Private ownership and control of land, as in the case of resources
in general, leads on balance to more efficient market allocation, which
leads to prosperity Prosperity is closely correlated with the ability and
willingness to pay for environmental protection. It also leads to more
technically efficient use of resources and thus a reduction of waste and
pollution.
2. Private ownership of land, if the required clearly defined rights are
present and effective, allows for mutually agreed upon changes in land
use, in response to changing circumstances, through trading that is gener-
ally cooperative, in contrast to often acrimonious political decisions.
3. Private ownership of land causes the owner's personal wealth to
be, in effect, a hostage to the owner's protection and conservation of the
owned land. The capital market operates as the voice of future potential
users, providing both information (in land markets) about market
participants' estimates of future values that can be compared to current use
values-uses that may increase or reduce future values and thus asset
values. The capital market (land asset market in this case) provide also the
incentive for owners to act on this information, as if they care about future
users, in order to conserve or increase the portion of their wealth that is
represented in land asset value.
4. Common law protects property owners and others who are affected
by pollution, independent of the political might of those protected. Rights
to be free of harmful pollution are upheld in the courts, when owners or
other threatened parties seek protection and can show that a polluter is
causing (or would cause) a problem.
Public sector ownership means political and bureaucratic control, and
a lack of both information-generating markets and the incentive to react
constructively to changing circumstances. Only politics and bureaucratic
procedures remain, to identify and implement alternatives that result in
mutually beneficial results for all who are sufficiently interested to ap-
proach the trading table. Government ownership has its trading possibili-
ties, but rancor and animosity seem consistently, and for understandable
reasons, to play a larger role. To discredit one's competitors is often a
winning strategy in a public setting. And a great many mutually beneficial
trades do not happen, when the political and bureaucratic systems do not
make the personal rewards to individual entrepreneurial activity large
enough to attract and to finance the persistence that is needed for innova-
tion in the context of government decision making.
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To be sure, no system is perfect. The failure to meet the goal of
perfection should not cause the rejection of either traditional government
control or the market mechanism. However, having examined several areas
where reliance on private solutions can be compared with governmental
control, this article has argued that private ownership and control and the
market system, are seriously underrated and in fact have worked far better
in numerous venues than traditional beliefs would suggest. When com-
pared with continued public ownership, private ownership of assets such
as land has a great many virtues in regard to environmental management
and stewardship on behalf of future generations.

